Is Deterrence Reliable?

Deterrence has been used through out modern politics as a means of avoiding confrontation between states.  Deterrence, when successful is ‘the dissuasion of the one adversary by another from undertaking hostile military action by convincing him that such action would be unsuccessful or too costly since it would incur military counter action.’ The use of deterrence by the West has been, in most circumstances a means of defence against the ‘Western security system’. 
   Deterrence can be described as a second strike strategy, where if another state initiates the first action, the other state retaliates. If however both states use a deterrence strategy, there will be no war. An example of this can be seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Cold War and was thus a successful use of the strategy. Other successful use of deterrence can be seen with Iraq 1994. Failures in the use of deterrence are World War One, the Korean War, and Iraq 1990.
   Pre 1945, deterrence involved threats of military and navy capability and balance of power between states, with threats that if another state acted out of line there would be retaliation from other states. An example of this is in the early 1900s when German admiral Alfred von Tirpitz based his naval strategy upon the theory that Great Britain would decide not to fight even an inferior German navy if there would be heavy losses in the process, leaving the British Navy inferior to other rivals.
   Deterrence pre-1945, however relied on the military power being able to retaliate if the deterrent did not succeed. Even then, after engaging in conflict, often this would lead to fighting that would not do that excessive damage. An example of this can be seen with the failure of the powers of Europe to deter Germany from invading Poland before World War Two, this resulted in a large-scale war, where the victor was uncertain. With the development of nuclear weapons, the deterrence theory could be taken to another level, with the massive destruction these weapons could produce. Experts from ‘non-aligned countries’ ‘point out that deterrence has been exercised through the ages…however, nuclear deterrence as practiced between the nuclear-weapon Powers is different from other form of deterrence, since in this case both the aggressor and the victim of the aggressor are bound to suffer unacceptable levels of damage, irrespective of the decisions of the battlefield.’ Therefore nuclear deterrence are more threatening on the battlefield and more likely to deter the rival state.  
   The Cold War represented the use of nuclear deterrence, and is an example of these deterrence working successfully using threats of nuclear weaponry. A prime example of this was the Cuban Missile Crisis in which, Khrushchev placed nuclear missiles in Cuba as a deterrent to the USA from invading the island. This increased already mounted tensions between Russia and the USA, resulting in both countries using deterrence against each other, with neither willing to initiate a first strike. Honoré M. Catudal explains ’It is clear…that over the Soviet missiles in Cuba the United States was ready to go to nuclear war, if necessary. President Kennedy resorted to quarantining Cuba, and as a result of both countries using these nuclear deterrence, and each country afraid of the risks of a first strike, the crisis was resolved and the USSR returned the nuclear weapons back to the USSR. As a result of both countries threatening massive destruction on one another, as well as each threatening immediate retaliation in the result of a first strike, this resulted in both countries backing down and bringing the crisis to an end.  Honoré M. Catudal however, argues that ’the Cuban missile crisis was the most dangerous and famous case in which nuclear deterrence is alleged to have played a significant role. Yet this analysis of that event, however brief, reveals that the Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba represented a major failure of United States’ deterrent policy. Moreover, during the crisis, nuclear deterrence was not decisive; it merely made the leadership in both the United States and the Soviet Union more cautious - which is not necessarily the same thing.’ This gives the argument that although contributing to a crisis, deterrence increase tensions between states.  
   During the Korean War nuclear deterrence were also successfully used by the USA. After China took North Korea in 1950, President Truman threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese. After the deployment of air divisions by the USSR to Eastern Asia, and the increasing Chinese forces near the Korean border, Truman ordered American forces to mobilise nuclear weapons. This deterred further large scale interference from China and the USSR, and although it did not end the fighting, it lead the way for the end of the war. 
   Even today, America maintains thousands of troops in South Korea to deter North Korea from invading, which has so far been successful, giving more evidence to deterrence being reliable.

   An issue with deterrence, as highlighted by Colin S. Gray is that deterrence only works if the rival states fear the consequences of retaliation. An example of deterrence not working in the East, is Saddam Hussein’s attack on the Kurds, even with support from Iran, along with American and Israeli support acting as a deterrent. With this attack, Iran responded and creating conflict. This provides the question that if the USA continues with a deterrence policy against the East, is it possible that war will still occur but with nuclear weapons. Colin S. Gray writes ‘the American theory and attempted practice of deterrence suffers from a potentially fatal confusion of rationality with reasonableness…The assumption is that rational foes must share our strategic logic, or at least ought to be readily accessible to its unmistakeable contingent menaces…There will be political leaders in the future, as there have been frequently in the past, who because of alcohol, drugs, or illness, either temporarily and erratically, or permanently, will not be able to function rationally.’ This shows that using nuclear deterrence can provide a huge risk that if the rival state retaliates as a result of an illogical decision by a ruler in the future, the consequences could result in nuclear war.
   Gray goes on to describe that if enemies of America do not care for bloodshed, that deterrence is still valid. ‘Of course, al Qaeda cannot be deterred by the prospective death of some of its troops, the blood of martyrs will attract new recruits. However the organization itself, in loose-knit sophisticated networked from though it is, should be eminently deferrable…First, it ought to be deferrable by a growing conviction that they are failing… Second, to survive and prosper al Qaeda has to be careful of the lives of its most important members. Were it otherwise, the organization would be out of business in short order. Credible threats to the lives of those people, and their ability to function in command can have deterring effect. This shows deterrence to be reliable in some cases, often when used with other types of conflict. 
   Another criticism on the use of deterrence is the effect it has on the arms race. A Study On Deterrence: A Compilation of Points of View explains that ‘in the view of the experts from the Warsaw countries, since the concept of nuclear deterrence is based on the ‘credibility’ of using military power, it is aimed at achieving military superiority. In contradiction to its alleged readiness to accept priority, the United States, preaching the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, is generating ever-new spirals in the arms race with the aim of increasing nuclear war-fighting capabilities. The United States has been the initiator of all the major and the most dangerous new weapon systems… The assertion that developments in technology most unavoidably lead to ever-new weapon systems which put mankind on a level with the sorcerer’s apprentice, why did not know how to control the spirits he conjured up.’ Thus a result of the deterrence is arguably a creation of an arms race that creates weapons that become dangerous to human society and therefore going against the credibility of deterrence being reliable. An example of this can be seen in the Cold War with the massive nuclear arms race between the USSR and the USA. 
   In conclusion, deterrence can be seen as a reliable method, in most cases, and given the evidence, especially nuclear deterrence, where the consequences of not obeying would be disastrous. The Cold War and especially the Cuban Missile Crisis can be seen as a great success for the deterrence theory. If however war had been started, the results would be irreparable; and with the need for only one nuclear strike actually being initiated during a war. On top of this with more East-West tensions arising, including the tensions with North Korea, with the possibilities of building of weapons of mass destruction. The use of deterrence has become a major risk, lowering the reliability of deterrence. The theory needs therefore to be operated with major caution.